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Abstract
In 1979, the Chinese government introduced the One-child Policy for the
purpose of controlling population growth. Thirty years later, the fertility rate in
China has declined to a very low level and one-child families have become the
norm. At the same time, the consequences of low fertility rates have emerged. In
2015, the government announced a new policy that encouraged couples to have
two children in order to raise the total fertility rate. In this paper, I analyze the
economic and legal implications of the Chinese family planning policies. By
examining to what extent fertility decisions are affected by government policies,
I evaluate the potential effects of the Two-child Policy. The findings suggest that
the Two-child Policy might not be effective in increasing the total fertility rate.
Keywords: Family planning policies; China; Two-child Policy; fertility; demand
for children; family size; number of children
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Introduction
With a population of more than 1.35 billion today, China has long been
one of the most populous countries in the world. After having experienced a
rapid population growth in the 1950s, the government soon adopted population
reduction policies to control population growth by encouraging late marriage
and postponed childbearing. By the late 1970s, controlling population growth
and increasing GDP per capita had become China’s primary goals under the
leadership of Deng Xiaoping. As a result, the One-child Policy was introduced in
1979 for the purpose of lowering the fertility rate and achieving economic
prosperity. While regarded by many as “the boldest and largest experiment in
population control in the history of the world” due to its extensive and strict
implementation, the One-child Policy successfully reduced the family size in
China and brought the fertility rate to a historical low in the 1990s1.
Over the years, many have called for the relaxation of the Chinese family
planning policies to allow couples to have more than one child. On October 29,
2015, the Communist Party of China (CPC) announced the new family planning
policy that encouraged all couples in China to have two children. In the
announcement, the CPC noted that the demographic structure of China had
changed dramatically since entering the 21st century. The CPC pointed out that,
with the fertility rate dropping significantly, the working age population had
started to shrink and the elderly were becoming an increasing share of the
population. This change of policy was aimed to improve the age structure of the
population, to effectively increase the labor supply, and to ease the pressure of
Caven S. McLoughlin, "The coming of age of China's single child policy,"
Psychology in the Schools 42, no. 3 (2005): 312.
1
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an aging society. In December 2015, a draft amendment to China’s National Law
on Population and Family Planning was sent to the national legislative body, the
National People’s Congress, for review and approval. The amendment was
passed on December 27, 2015 and came into effect on January 1, 2016, officially
putting an end to the One-child Policy that had been in place since 1979.
Although the law has changed to allow two children in every family, it is
unclear how much of an effect this change will have on the fertility level. In An
Economic Analysis of Fertility, Becker pointed out that fertility decisions are
determined by a variety of factors, such as income, cost of children, and tastes.2
Thus, while the family planning policies have a large influence on the fertility
level in China, it is not the only thing that affects fertility decisions. During the
thirty years in which the One-child Policy was in place, other factors influencing
fertility decisions might have changed to result in a different ideal family size
among Chinese families. In this thesis, I aim to understand the nature and the
size of the impact that the Two-child Policy might have on the fertility decisions
by analyzing the fertility effects of past family planning polices and taking into
account other important factors influencing family size decisions in China.

Gary S. Becker, "An economic analysis of fertility," Demographic and economic
change in developed countries, Columbia University Press, 1960: 211.
2
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Literature Review

Before I go into analyzing the potential effects of the Two-child Policy, it is
important to look at previous family planning policies and their impact on the
fertility level. In this section, I will provide an overview of the Chinese family
planning policies with a focus on the One-child Policy and its impact on the
fertility rate in China. By studying the ways in which the One-child Policy was
implemented, I hope to show how this policy changed people’s fertility behaviors
over the years and how it was raised to a legal status before any legislation was
even adopted. In addition, I will analyze the significance of the adoption of
Chinese Family Planning Law in 2000. Understanding the implications of
previous policies will help us better determine how effective the Two-child
Policy will be in raising the fertility level.

Early Family Planning Policies and Campaigns
In China, the government has launched many family planning programs
and made policies regarding family sizes since the 1950s. In the three decades
following the end of the Chinese Civil War and the establishment of People’s
Republic of China in1949, the country experienced a population explosion due to
ideological and political reasons. In the early 1950s, the CPC’s leader Mao Ze
Dong pointed to the need for more workers in agriculture and advocated for
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larger families.3 The population policy at that time thus encouraged more births
per family. Women who gave birth to more babies even received titles of honors.
As a result, China reached a total fertility rate (TFR)4 as high as 6.3 in 1965,
compared to a world average of 5 at that time. Within thirty years, China’s
population increased by more than 260 million.5 However, as the country
experienced a widespread famine in the early 1960s, the government soon
realized that the limited arable land would not be able to sustain such fast
population growth and that population control was needed.
In the early 1970s, the government launched a new family planning
campaign to control the population growth. The slogan wan, xi, shao embodied
the three important aspects of this new family planning policy: late marriage,
birth spacing and fewer children.6 The rules were most strictly applied in urban
cities, where couples were ordered to delay marriage and childbearing until an
older age (25 for women and 28 for men) and to space out the births of children
by three to four years. The policy also encouraged a smaller family size by
limiting the number of children in each family to two or three, depending on the
region. As a result this campaign, the TFR dropped significantly during the 1970s,
from 5.9 in 1970 to 2.9 in 1979. As shown in Figure 1, there was a consistent
decrease in fertility rate throughout the 1970s.

Xiaorong Li, "License to coerce: Violence against women, state responsibility,
and legal failures in China's family-planning program," Yale JL & Feminism 8
(1996): 145.
4 Total fertility rate is the average number of children a woman would have
throughout her childbearing years.
5 Skalla, Nicole M, "Chna's One-Child Policy: Illegal Children and the Family
Planning Law," Brook. J. Int'l L. 30 (2004): 329.
6 Isabelle Attané, "China's family planning policy: an overview of its past and
future." Studies in family planning 33, no. 1 (2002): 103.
3
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Figure 1. Totally Fertility Rate in China (1960-2015)
Source: The World Bank

The One-child Policy and its implementation
While the wan, xi, shao policy significantly lowered the fertility level, it
was not enough to control population growth due to a large population base. By
the late 1970s, some population specialists had already predicted that this policy
would fail to meet the State’s official target by 2000, which was to limit the
population to 1.2 billion. More importantly, the nation’s population was
increasing at a rate that was considered as unsustainable compared to the rate of
economic growth. At that time, China was home to nearly a quarter of the world’s
population, but it had only seven percent of word’s arable land.7 While
population increased steadily, the domestic economy was barely growing and
had a staggering GDP growth rate. This led to a low GDP per capita that was way
below the world’s average level. As shown in Figure 2, in 1979, China’s GDP per

Therese Hesketh, Li Lu, and Zhu Wei Xing, "The effect of China's one-child
family policy after 25 years," New England Journal of Medicine 353, no. 11 (2005):
1171.
7
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capita was only around $180, while the world average was about $2270.8
Coming out the Cultural Revolution, which lasted from 1966 to 1976 and caused
serious economic stagnation, the new Party leader Deng Xiaoping was ready to
initiate an economic reform for the purpose of quickly increasing GDP per capita
and improving living standards. Thus, lowering birth rate and controlling
population growth thus became a national priority.

Thousands

GDP per capita (in current US dollars)
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8
6

China
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World

2
0

Figure 2. GDP per capita, China and World Average
Source: The World Bank
In order to reach the population goal and to facilitate the economic
reform, Deng announced a new family planning policy that would promote the
norm of the one-child family in 1979, known later as the One-child Policy.9 To
urge couples to follow the policy, the government claimed that “population
control [was] the most important step toward a higher standard of living”, and
warned its people that “the only alternative to population control [was] poverty,
high infant mortality, and malnutrition.”10 In 1980, the Central Party Committee

Data obtained from the World Bank database. The definition of the GDP per
capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population, measured in
current U.S. dollars.
9 Li, op. cit., p.148.
10Ibid., p.150.
8
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issued the order stating that each couple may only have one child. The rule was
then implemented throughout the country. This uniform standard soon faced
resistance from the people, especially in less developed rural areas where there
was a need for a large agricultural labor force and where the family size was
generally bigger than that in urban cities.
In 1984, the government reconsidered the policy and made changes to
accommodate the need of different populations. Considering the traditional
preference for a son and that the number of male labor directly affected the
family’s livelihood in some places, the new policy allowed a second child in
families in rural areas if the first child was a girl.11 Moreover, parents who were
both the only child in their families could have more than one child. In general,
people of minority groups were also allowed more children, but specific
regulations depended on the region.12 This led to a diverse policy regime where
the rules were mostly strictly implemented in urban areas upon those who held
non-agricultural household registration, but were more flexible in less developed
rural areas or regions with large minority populations (Figure 3). However, even
for those who were eligible to have a second child, couples were required to
apply for second-birth permit with a fee before they plan to conceive a child.
After obtaining the birth permit, couples were also typically required to wait five
years after the first birth. 13

Feng Wang, "Can China afford to continue its one-child policy?" AsiaPacific
Issues, no.77 (2005): 2.
12 Ibid.
13 Skalla, op. cit., 336.
11
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Facing strong domestic resistance, the State did not adopt any legislation
that codified the One-child Policy at the time of its implementation. The
economic and cultural diversity in China also made it a great challenge for the
legislature to enact a uniform law to regulate the entire country. However, this
did not prevent the policy from being implemented successfully. At that time,
directives from the Communist Party were almost equivalent, if not superior, to
legislation.14 The absolute leadership of the Communist Party, as one of the four
cardinal principles, was written into the Constitution, and there was no check on
the political power of the Party from either the legislative body or the judicial
branch.15 As a result, policies made by the Party did not merely provide guidance
for what it wanted the society to achieve as a whole, but were often perceived as
enforceable laws without having to be approved by the legislature. Moreover, the
policy did not rely on a functioning court system for its implementation, but was
directly carried out by Party officials at different levels.

14
15

Li, op. cit., p150.
Ibid.
12

While no legislation was made to embody the One-child Policy per se, the
State amended other laws and adopted other legislation to justify the legality of
the practice of family planning. The 1980 Marriage Law first set out that
“husband and wife are in duty bound to practice family planning”, making it a
legal obligation of married couples to follow the policy and practice family
planning.16 In addition, it required the youngest age at which people could
register to marry to be 22 years of age for men and 20 for women. Late
childbearing was also encouraged. In 1982, the 5th National People’s Congress
adopted the current Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. The
amended Constitution states that “[t]he State promotes family planning so that
population growth may fit the plans for economic and social development” and
that “[b]oth husband and wife have the duty to practice family planning”, which
gave the state constitutional power to regulate fertility decisions in families.17
Nevertheless, neither the amended Constitution nor the Marriage Law explicitly
said that each couple may only have one child unless they fitted into some
specific categories.
Instead, the specifics of the One Child Policy were clarified in central
government resolutions, directives, and provincial regulations.18 First of all,
couples needed to obtain birth permits before trying to conceive a child. After
having the permitted number of children, at least one spouse was required to use
long-term contraception. In addition, for couples who gave out-of-plan births,
one spouse was forced to be sterilized.19 Without a specific legislation to regulate

Attané, op. cit., p.103.
ibid., p.104.
18 Skalla, op. cit., p.329.
19 Skalla, op. cit., p. 336.
16
17
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fertility behaviors, the policy was implemented not according to the rule of law
but the rule set by party directives. The implementation of the OCP was thus a
top-down process through which the central government placed serious
restrictions on the intimate aspects of individual lives.20 A Birth Planning
Commission was set up at the national level to provide guidance for the
implementation of the policy.21 Family Planning Commissions were also created
at the provincial, county and even grass-roots level to oversee family planning
activities. Through this mechanism, the government designated annul birth
quotas for each region, and measures were carried out by local officials, party
leaders, and even informants at workplaces to makes sure that the number of
births did not exceed the quota. 22
In general, local authorities and party officials had discretion in deciding
what measure should be taken to keep births under quotas and to deter
noncompliance. Economic incentives were provided to urge people to adhere to
the one-child rule. Those who proceeded with unauthorized pregnancy were
often forced to abort the child and were subject to severe, sometimes extreme,
punishment. Stiff fines were charged in cases of non-compliance and couples
were threatened with disqualification for social benefits in housing, education
and subsidized child care.23 They also faced the risk of being dismissed from
employment and losing their income. Moreover, the tightly organized Chinese
society created a social pressure for people to obey the policy. Psychological
intimidation and public humiliation existed in many forms, such as public
Ibid.
Gabe T. Wang, "China’s population control policy." China Report 32, no. 2
(1996): 153.
22Li, op. cit., p.151.
23Ibid., p.153.
20
21
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postings and monitoring. In extreme cases, violence was used to force
compliance, including physical abuse and property destruction.24
Due to its draconian implementation, the One-child Policy was perceived
to be a law in the Chinese society for a long time even though it did not hold
formal legal status. While not everyone voluntarily supported the policy, the
majority of people complied with it and put pressure on those who did not do so.
However, without codification, this top-down process led to many legal failures.
As some have pointed out, since government officials were appointed to carry
out directly the penalties in cases of non-compliance, few opportunities were
provided for legal representation, hearings, appeals, or judicial review.25

The Impact of the One-child Policy on Family Size
Despite the criticism that it received from both domestic and
international communities, the One-child Policy was effective to some extent in
controlling population growth and was credited with contributing to two
decades of rapid per capita economic growth. Although a lot of couples did not
like the One-child Policy, many people expressed that they did not have a choice
other than complying with it under the strict scrutiny of family planning
committees.26 However, many people, mainly urban dwellers, young people
enrolled in major universities and intellectuals, were also aware of the economic

24Ibid.,

p.154.
p.151.
26 Norah L. Lweis, "Implementing social change: China and the one child policy."
International Review of Modern Sociology (1987): 245.
25Ibid.,
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and social consequences that could result from the problem of overpopulation.27
Thus, many of them believed that reducing the population was the responsibility
of all Chinese people and have gradually embodied the policy into their
behaviors and the new cultural norms.28
Consequently, the TFR dropped from 2.9 in 1979 to about 1.5 in the late
90s, below the replacement rate of 2.0, and has remained pretty stable after29.
According to a survey in 1985, out of 162.3 million married women of
reproductive age in China, 85.8 percent were practicing birth control.30 In the
1990s, the age at first marriage among women rose from 22 to 24.31 The
National Family Planning and Reproductive Health Survey conducted in 2001
also showed a great reduction in family size.32 The survey interviewed 39,585
women aged 15 to 49 years from 31 provinces, autonomous regions and
municipalities. According to the survey, more than 57 percent of the women
interviewed had no more than one child. Less than 30 percent had two children.
In urban areas where the rules were applied more strictly, almost 85 percent of
the participants had no more than one child. In comparison, families with two
children were more common in rural areas (about 35 percent). Women aged
between 20-29 generally had smaller family size (one child or less) not only
because they were young, but also because the government tightened the
regulations about the same time as they entered their reproductive years. For
Ibid.
Ibid.
29Replacement rate is the rate at which a population exactly replaces itself from
one generation to the next, without migration.
30 Wang, op. cit., p.155.
31 Wang, op. cit., p.4.
32 Jian Qu Ding and Therese Hesketh. "Family size, fertility preferences, and sex
ratio in China in the era of the one child family policy: results from national
family planning and reproductive health survey." BMJ 333, no. 7564 (2006): 371.
27
28
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the same reasons, it was more common for women of aged between 40-49 to
have larger family size. About 30 percent of the participants that fell into this age
group had more than three children.

Source: Ding and Hesketh (2006)
Following the economic reform, the government also “voiced its
commitment to strengthening the rule of law” and put more efforts into
legislative drafting in many areas of law.33 As people began to accept the onechild norm and were no longer resistant to the policy, the legislators drafted the
first family planning law that codified the One-child Policy. As a result, the
Chinese Family Planning Law was adopted in 2001. The adoption of this law
confirmed the legal reality in China that the rights of individuals are
subordinated to the State’s interest and that the State has legal power in
regulating the “private sphere”, including people’s intimate lives and family

Pitman B. Potter, "Legal reform in China: institutions, culture, and selective
adaptation," Law & Social Inquiry 29, no. 2 (2004): 470.
33
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fertility decisions. It also indicated that the practice of family planning was
already widely accepted by Chinese families and had become an inseparable part
of the culture.34
In summary, the One-child Policy not only greatly influenced people’s
fertility behaviors, but also changed their intrinsic valuation of children. While
the new legislation now allows two children in every family, it is unclear whether
people will choose to have one more child since they are now used to having
small families. Thus, whether there will be an increase in the number of children
per family depends on to what extent the decline in fertility rate was caused by
the family planning polices. In the following section, I will introduce an
economic model that explains the factors influencing family size decisions in
Chinese families in an effort to predict how effective the new policy will be in
terms of raising fertility rates.

34

Skalla, op.cit., p.361.
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Data, Model and Results
In An Economic Analysis of Fertility, Becker laid out an economic
framework for analyzing the factors that influence the number of children
parents decide to have in the family.35 In his model, he characterized children as
a consumer durable because, as opposed to being a one-time payment, the
expenditure on children is constantly changing as the child grows up.36 He
pointed out that, similar to other goods, children provide utilities and mainly
“psychic income” to parents.37 Using a supply and demand model, Becker
explained that the demand for children depends on both economic factors such
as income and child costs and non-economic factors such as knowledge of
contraception, the culture and tastes. According to him, the cost of children is
simply the present value of input (expected outlays and the imputed value of the
parents’ services) minus the present value of return (expected money return and
the imputed value of the child’s services). Moreover, he differentiated between
the expenditure on children and the cost of children by pointing out that an
increase in expenditure per children does not necessarily lead to an increase in
cost because the quality of children also changes when the expenditure per child
goes up. 38
Becker’s model was based on the assumption that couples have perfect
control over both the number of children and spacing of their births. However, as
I have shown in the previous section, both of these decisions were strictly
regulated by the State in China. Since the 1980s, the One-child Policy had limited
Becker, op. cit., p.210.
Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., p.213.
35
36
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the number of children, regulated the spacing of children, and established
penalties for those who did not comply with the policy. In this way, family
planning policies became one of the most important factors that Chinese families
would take into consideration when making family size decisions. In this section,
I will modify and add to Becker’s model to take into account the unique
circumstances in China in an effort to explain how Chinese couples come to
decide on the number of children they want in the family. An important thing to
note here is that, unlike other goods that can be purchased on the market,
children can only be produced at home in most cases, which makes parents both
the suppliers and consumers of children. Thus, for my analysis, I will mainly
focus on the demand side of the equation.

Framework for Analyzing Demand for Children in Chinese Families
Many things can affect the number of children in families in general,
including both economic and non-economic factors. In my model, I will examine
a number of factors that are the most important in fertility decisions specific to
Chinese families. In equation form, the demand for children in Chinese families
can be represented as:
Cd = f (family planning polices, income, rearing cost, tastes, demand for
labor on the farm, …),
where Cd represents the number of children. By analyzing how and to what
extent these factors above influence the number of children born to each couple,
I hope to find out how the Two-child Policy will affect the fertility level. An
important thing to point out here is that I am focusing on analyzing changes in

20

the quantity of children in Chinese families as opposed to the quality of children
in my model. As Becker describes, the quality of a child could be characterized as
the level of living provided to him or her. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish
between the total consumption of children (which takes into account both the
quantity and quality of children) and the number of children demanded. As I am
looking at policy effects on the fertility rate, which only captures changes in the
number of children, I am simply referring to demand for children as the number
children desired by families in this paper. That being said, I will still consider
changes in the quality of children as an important component to my analysis
since if often influences the number of children born to every family.

Family Planning Polices
As I have explained in the previous section, the success of the One-child
Policy was built upon a reward-penalty mechanism. Those who refused to
comply with the policy received fines, and in some cases, lost their jobs and
social benefits for themselves as well as for their children. As a result, many
people chose to adhere to the policy because they could not afford the fines or
losing employment. However, the monetary cost was not all that burdened the
couples who wanted more than one child. Couples who proceeded with
unauthorized pregnancies and had out-of-plan children were often threatened
with violence and were publicly humiliated. Under such intense social pressure,
many people who could have afforded the monetary cost of having an additional
child chose not to do so because of the associated political cost.

21

By imposing serious penalties on those who violated the one-child rule,
the government was essentially raising the marginal cost of having an additional
child. Assuming that that the marginal benefit provided by children remains
constant, the extraordinarily high marginal cost of having a second child forcibly
reduced the demand for children in Chinese families at each given level of
income and quality of children. This can be illustrated in the graph below, where
the horizontal axis represents the number of children and the vertical axis
represents the net cost of children. Suppose point A represents the level of
demand for children before the One-child Policy, the increasing net cost of
children due to the implementation of the policy essentially resulted in a
movement up along the demand curve from point A to point B, causing the
demand for children to drop.

Figure 4. The Effect of the One-child Policy on the Demand for Children
Theoretically, holding other factors constant, when the Two-child Policy
lowers the marginal cost of having a second child, it should reverse to some
extent the effect of the One-child Policy. While it is unlikely that the demand
would return the level when no restriction on the number of children existed, the
lifting of the one-child rule should still increase the demand by a decent amount.
22

To illustrate this on the graph, we would expect to see a movement down along
the demand curve to somewhere between point A and B. However, in real life,
there are many other factors that are influencing the demand for children at the
same time. During the years in which the One-child Policy was implemented,
other factors might have changed so much that the demand for children is no
longer the same as what it was thirty years ago. Therefore, the size of the
increase in the number of children children as a result of the new policy will
depend on to what extent is the demand for children affected by other factors.

Income
In most cases, people consume a bigger bundle of goods when there is a
rise in income. According to Becker, the amount of children consumed in every
family is also influenced by family income. Holding other things constant, an
increase in household income will presumably lead to a higher consumption of
children due to the parents’ increasing ability to afford them.
Before the economic reform in the 1980s, there was a long period of
economic stagnation in China, which resulted in a low level of national income
and GDP per capita. As shown in Figure 2 in the previous section, China’s GDP
per capita in 1980 was only $193, while the world average at that time was more
than ten times of that value ($2,500). However, China has experienced
remarkable economic growth in the past three decades. By 2015, China’s GDP
per capita reached $7,924. While this was still below the world average ($10,004
in 2015), the gap between the two has narrowed significantly. With such huge
increase in income, one would expect the consumption of children to rise over

23

the years. However, a higher consumption of children does not always
necessarily lead to an increase in the number of children per family. As Becker
pointed out in his analysis, for consumer durables like cars and houses, people
tend to purchase more units as well as better quality units at higher income
levels.39 Similarly, an increase in the amount of children consumed as a result of
an increase in income can come from a change in the quantity or the quality of
children, or both. Thus, it could only be said that, at a given quality, the number
of children will increase as income rises.
Becker further argued that while an increase in income can lead to both
an increase in the quantity and the quality of children, the quantity elasticity is
smaller than the quality elasticity. This is especially true in China’s case, since the
family planning policy placed a cap on the number of children that families could
have. As each couple were only allowed to have one or two children, it is
reasonable to assume that people might want their children to be of higher
quality and thus were more willing to provide them with better a living and
learning environment. Therefore, the huge increase in income among Chinese
families might have translated into an improvement in the quality of children
rather than an increase in the number of children consumed. In fact, an increase
in expenditures on children that is often associated with a rise in the quality of
children can even lead to a lower demand for children by raising the expected
rearing cost.

39

Becker, op. cit., p. 212.
24

Rearing Cost
The huge increase in income level has led to higher living standards and a
greater consumption of goods among Chinese families. As the quantity of
children was limited by the State under the One-child Policy, parents were
spending more and more on their children with the hope to increase the quality
of their children. Some researchers have pointed out that parents with the
financial ability often wanted their children to have the resources and privileges
that they did not enjoy during their childhood.40 As family size declined over the
years, parents provided their children with better nutrition, created a better
environment for the development of their mind and body, and invested more in
their education and intellectual development.41 This is especially true for
families with only one child in urban areas.
In 1999, the China Social Survey Institute carried out a survey regarding
family’s expenditure on children in three major cities – Beijing, Tianjin and
Shanghai. As expected, the results indicated that expenditure on children was
proportional to the level of income. However, in many families, children’s
consumption took up a significant portion of the income. Among 85% of families
who participated in the survey, children’s consumption consisted one third or
more of the family’s income.42 In fact, 35.6% of the families spent about 40% of
their monthly income on children, and almost 20% of the families spent 50% or

Deborah Davis, “The consumer revolution in urban China,” Vol. 22. University
of California Press, 2000: 179.
41 Guan Ying, "Consumption patterns of Chinese children," Journal of Family and
Economic Issues 24, no. 4 (2003): 374.
42 Ibid.
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more of the income on children.43 According to the survey, children’s
consumption level was greater than the adults’ consumption level in many
families. These numbers indicate that the rearing cost of children has risen to a
very high level among Chinese families. While the rearing cost of existing
children increases, the expected rearing cost for an additional child is also
increasing at the same time, as parents now want “better” children than before.
Thus, at every income level, parents today might feel that they can only afford
one or two children since they have a very different standard for how much
should be spent on each child than they had thirty years ago. As a result, the
demand for children might have decreased over the years in families at all
income levels. In addition, as the expectation for expenditures on children
continues to rise, it is very likely that, when there is a increase in income, parents
are more inclined to spend that extra money on existing children rather than
deciding to have more children of lower quality.
Besides the higher expectation for the quality of children, other things
could have also raised the rearing cost. For example, in 1986, the National
People’s Congress passed the Law for Compulsory Education with the goal to
establish universal nine-year compulsory education and to reduce illiteracy rate,
especially in rural areas.44 While the government assumed the primary
responsibility for funding the compulsory education, the cost was shared by
farmers through a household-based contract responsibility system that was
established in the late 1970s.45 Although this legislation only made compulsory
what was already done by most of the parents voluntarily, it did increase the
Ibid.
Zhang and Zhao, op. cit., p.263.
45 Ibid., p.264.
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rearing cost of children for low-income families in rural areas where some
parents would not have sent their children to school if not required. Thus, the
demand for children in these families with limited financial ability could have
also increased due to such new legislation or policies.
As children were becoming more and more costly, people might want to
resort to other goods for acquiring utilities. Thus, it is necessary to look at how
people’s preferences for goods have changed over the years and how these
changes can influence the number of children demanded.

Tastes
As Becker explained in his analysis, parents receive utilities from children
as well as from other goods. Tastes can thus be understood as people’s
preferences for children relative to other goods. He pointed out that, while no
goods can be perfect substitutes for children due to the “psychic income” that
they provide to their parents, certain goods can still be considered as very poor
substitutes for children.46 In China’s case, consumer preference for children has
changed significantly since the late 1970s due to changes in domestic
consumption and cultural values.
Before the economic reform, China had a planned economy for decades.
State-owned enterprises distributed social welfare as well as consumer items
that were unavailable elsewhere, such as movie tickets, fresh fruits and even
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apartments.47 Such redistributive practices resulted in relatively homogenous
living standards within the society, as not many consumer goods were available
to households due to the lack of a well-functioning, competitive market.
Research has shown that between 1957 and 1982, families in urban areas spent
around 58 percent of their income on food and drinks while the work units
rationed basic necessities.48 The same consumption patterns also existed in rural
areas where the income level was even lower. Additionally, the socialist ideology
dictated consumer fashions and discouraged people from buying personal items
that were deemed as bourgeois and therefore improper for the collectivecentered value system.49 Consequently, the utilities that people could receive
from other goods were very limited. When Deng Xiaoping initiated the economic
reform in the early 1980s, he advocated for an open-market economy that
completely transformed people’s consumer behaviors. With its market-based
principles, the new economic model allowed private actors and entities to
contract out some industries that ware owned by the State and encouraged
entrepreneurship for small businesses.50 As a result, rationing disappeared, and
market activities took place.
By the late 1990s, the country had experienced what was called “a
consumer revolution”, especially in urban areas.51 The rapid increase in income
and the expansion of marketplace allowed people to live according to their own
preferences. This consumer revolution started from a more balanced and

Linda, Chao and Ramon H. Myers, "China's consumer revolution: the 1990s
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48 Ibid., p.355.
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nutritious diet. People started to include more meat, coarse grains, and even
seafood in their meals. Moreover, while families used to spend a large portion of
their income on food and drink, they could then afford to buy more households
items, such as bicycles, washing machines, computers, and air conditions, and
more goods for recreational and educational purposes.52 High-income families
looked for better quality goods and shopped at department stores where
expensive imported goods were sold. In addition, households were also more
willing to spend more for personal pleasure. Families frequently ate out at nice
restaurants, went to karaoke clubs, and went to movies at theaters. Gradually, a
middle class that enjoyed higher quality of life emerged and set consumer habits
and fashions for the lower-income class.53 This consumer revolution soon
resulted in much higher living standards in China, especially in urban areas and
coastal cities.
Such improvement in the standard of living significantly changed people’s
preference for children relative to other goods. As Becker pointed out, parents
will choose to have an additional child “whenever the expected utility per dollar
of expected cost from an additional child [are] greater than that from
expenditure elsewhere.”54 Before the economic reform, which happened about
the same time when the One-child Policy was implemented, parents consumed
more children presumably because they received more utilities from them
compared to other goods of the same cost. This might be due to a lack of other
consumer goods, a low income level and also a low net cost of children. In the
early 1980s, the family planning policy increased the marginal cost of a second
Ibid., 363.
365.
54Becker, op. cit., p. 216.
52

53Ibid.,
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child while the economic reform created competitive markets where a variety of
goods were available to consumers at relatively cheaper price. As the consumer
revolution unfolded, people gradually substituted children with other goods
from which they could receive the same or even more utilities, especially since
the rearing cost of children rose significantly over the years. Such change in
tastes could have caused the demand curve for children to shift in, leading to a
smaller number of children desired in Chinese families.
Given the new consumption patterns and different tastes for goods among
households nowadays, having an additional child means that the parents might
have to forgo some of the utilities that they receive from other goods and maybe
sacrifice the current living standard to provide for another child. Assuming that
the utilities that children provide to their parents remain the same, it is unlikely
that the parents will be willing to do so.

Demand for Labor in Agriculture
The total fertility rate in China reached as high as more than 6 children
per woman in the 1950s and 1960s. Such high fertility level was caused by many
economic, political and cultural reasons. An important factor that contributed to
such high fertility level was the high demand for labor in agriculture. According
to data from the World Bank, agriculture comprised over 40 percent of the GDP
in the late 1960s and remained to be the biggest sector in the Chinese economy
for a long time. As shown by the graph, employment in agriculture still made up
more than half of total employment just two decades ago. This is associated with
the fact that the majority of the population lived in rural areas where there was a
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lot of arable land and where traditional agricultural activities were the major
source of income. As shown in Figure 6, more than 80 percent of the population
lived in rural areas until the 1980s. In these areas, the labor-intensive agriculture
industry employed a majority of the labor force. Therefore, families in those
areas wanted more children, especially male children, to meet the high demand
for labor on the farm. It was also due to this reason that the One-child Policy was
later revised to allow families in rural areas to have a second child if the first
child was a girl. As a result, the family size in rural areas was generally larger
than the family size in urban areas.
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Figure 5. Employment by sector in China
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However, as China transitioned out of an agricultural-based society and
gradually shifted its focus to the industry and services sector, demand for labor
in agriculture has declined significantly. Today, half of the population lives in
urban areas, and the agriculture sector only comprises less than 3% of total
employment. Moreover, the extensive use of agricultural machinery has
substituted human labor and increased agricultural productivity on the farm. As
a result, families in rural areas who used to produce more children no longer
need that much labor, and therefore the demand for children in these places has
gradually decreased over the years.

What else is influencing fertility decisions?

Besides the factors that I have analyzed above, other things could have
also played an important role in family size decisions. For example, as the Onechild Policy forcibly reduced the number of children born to a couple, women
had more time to participate in social and economic activities. Traditionally,
32

women contributed to most of the housework and childcare due to the gender
ideology that viewed men as the primary provider and women as the primary
homemaker.55 However, according to the 1990 census, the labor participation
rate among women aged 25 or younger increased significantly since 1980.56
Presumably, a higher participation rate will lead women to desire fewer children,
considering that childbearing is a time-consuming activity. Moreover, as women
choose to put more time and energy into work, the opportunity cost of have
more children also became higher than what it was thirty years ago. As a result,
women who are in the workforce today might be less willingly to have more
children.
Furthermore, changes in cultural values might have also contributed to a
lower demand for children. Traditionally, people preferred a large family size for
various reasons. One was that people wanted more children to provide for their
old age. Moreover, the traditional preference for a son over a daughter also
resulted in a large family size since couples sometimes kept producing children
until they get a son. As the State advocated for a small family culture and
implemented the family planning policies, these cultural values have changed
considerably. In 1987, the National Statistical Bureau conducted a survey in nine
provinces in China regarding the purpose for raising children.57 The data
revealed that the traditional views about raising children to insure life in old age
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2 (2000): 194.
56Shaohong Liao and Zhenzhen Zheng. "The impact of demographic changes on
labor supply in China." The China Population and Labor Yearbook, Volume 1: The
Approaching Lewis Turning Point and Its Policy Implications 1 (2009): 40.
57 Wang, op. cit., p. 146.
55

33

and to keep a family name have changed significantly.58 Such changes in cultural
values might have to some extent facilitated the transition from a large family
culture to a small family one.
Another thing that could be taken into account is the growing need for
eldercare in Chinese families. In China, the proportion of population aged 60 or
over has reached 16.1% in 2015.59 As family members are now the dominant
caregivers of elderly people, a smaller family size means that each child is taking
on more responsibility to take care of their parents, especially since China is still
in the process of building a comprehensive pension system. This means that
parents will have less time for childcare and a lower ability to provide for an
additional child.60 As the single child generation enters their reproductive years,
they often need to balance between taking care of their parents and providing
for their children, which could potentially further push down the demand for
children.

Will the Two-child Policy raise the fertility level?
So far my analysis has shown how different factors could influence family
decisions in Chinese families. Some of these factors have changed drastically
since the implementation of the One-child Policy. While there was a huge
increase in household income, the rearing cost and the expectation for how much
one should spent on a child have also risen to a higher level. On one hand,
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parents in urban areas are striving to provide a higher standard of living for
themselves as well as for their children. As a result, they might value the quality
of their life and of their children more than the quantity of children they have in
the family. Moreover, higher labor participation rate among women today
indicates that they have less time for childcare and a higher opportunity cost for
leaving the job to have a baby, both of which could contribute to a smaller ideal
family size. On the other hand, as rural population decreased and the machinery
gradually substituted human labor on the farm, the demand for labor in
agriculture has declined, leading to lower demand for children among families in
rural areas. All these changes indicate that the children have become less
desirable among Chinese families.
How will this influence the effect of the Two-child Policy? As I pointed out
earlier, the One-child Policy lowered the demand for children in Chinese families
by placing a high price on having a second child. Similarly, the Two-child Policy
could increase the demand by removing the penalties for having a second child.
As shown in Figure 7, the effect of the Two Child Policy could thus be illustrated
as a movement down along the demand curve from point B to point C. However,
my analysis has shown that the demand for children has naturally declined to a
low level due to a number of reasons, including changes in rearing cost, people’s
preferences for goods and cultural values. The effects of these changes altogether
can be illustrated as an inward shift of the demand curve (Dc to Dc’). As a result,
we might end up getting a level of demand for children that is not much higher
from when the One-child Policy was in place (illustrated by point D). In other
words, the Two-child Policy might not have any great impact in terms of
increasing fertility rate in China.
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Figure 7. The Impact of the Two-child Policy on the Demand for Children
Evidence has suggested that such inward shift of the demand curve is very
possible. In the 2001 National Family Planning and Reproductive Health Survey,
the participants were asked about their preferences for the number of children.
The results showed that 35 percent of the participants preferred one child and
57 percent preferred two children. However, there was a noticeable difference
between urban and rural areas. The average number of children desired in
families in urban areas was only 1.44, compared to an average number of 1.77. In
addition, more than half of the participants from urban areas indicated that they
wanted only one child. This difference has important implications because the
Two-child Policy mainly targets families who live in urban areas, as people were
already allowed to have more than one child in most rural areas. Thus, if families
in urban areas do not actually more than one child, then the Two-child Policy
might not be able to make a difference. The results also indicated that as
women’s educational level rises, the preferred number of children becomes
smaller. Nevertheless, regardless of the areas of residence and the education
level, very few women (less than 2 percent) wanted more than two children.
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Assuming that people answered the questions truthfully, the survey suggested
an overall decrease in the demand for children among Chinese families and a
reduction in the desired family size.

Source: Ding and Hesketh (2006)
In fact, a two-child policy has existed in some places in China since the
mid-1980s. While a strict one-child rule was applied to most areas unless certain
conditions were satisfied, the government chose four places as experiment
locations to implement a comprehensive two-child policy. 61 Yicheng, a county in
Shanxi Province in China where a two-child policy has existed since 1985, has
been used as an example in many studies to show that China’s current low
fertility rate is not simply due to the family planning policies.62 Although every
family was allowed to have up to two children, the fertility rate in Yicheng did
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not appear to be much higher than that in other places. In 2000, the fertility rate
in Yicheng was only about 0.3 points above the national average of 1.5.63

In a study regarding the effect of the two-child policy in Yicheng, two
researchers estimated the birth rate that Yicheng would have had under the onechild rule using data from other counties of similar socioeconomic conditions in
the same province, and compared it with the actual birth rate data in Yicheng
from random samples.64 Figure 8 shows the difference between the actual birth
rate in Yicheng under the two-child policy, which is represented by the solid line,
and the projected birth rate that Yicheng would have had under the One-child
Policy, which is represented by the dotted line. The graph shows that the actual
birth rate in Yicheng is not very different, if not lower, from the simulated birth
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rate, indicating that the two-child policy did not result in a higher fertility level.
Again, this study confirms that people now naturally desire fewer children
regardless of the family planning polices.
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Conclusion

In this thesis, I provided an overview of the family planning policies in
China and their effects on fertility rates. In particular, I explained how the
draconian implementation of the One-child Policy changed people’s fertility
behaviors and reduced the family size. I also examined a series of legislation that
led to the codification of the One-child Policy and the significance of the adoption
of the Family Planning Law in 2001. In summary, although it was strictly
implemented throughout the country since the 1980s, the One-child Policy
existed without formal legal status for a long time. The State did not enact any
laws at that time partly because it wanted to avoid international criticism, but
also because the policy did not rely on any legislative power for its
implementation. As the CPC dictated law making at that time, the policy was
directly carried out by Party leaders, government officials, and family planning
committees at different levels.65 As are result, the policy was already perceived
as a law before it actually became one, and the adoption of the legislation
embodying this policy simply confirmed the reality that the public had accepted
the policy and had become used to a small family culture.
I then took a close look at the changes in demand for children among
Chinese families since the implementation of the One-child Policy. My analysis
showed that the demand for children among Chinese families has declined
considerably over the years. However, this decrease in demand was not solely
due to the family planning policies. Changes in income, rearing cost, tastes and
the expectation for the quality of children have made children less desirable in
65Skalla,

op. cit., p. 329.
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Chinese families, which lowered the fertility rate to the current level. Moreover,
there has been a decrease in demand for children among families in rural areas
where the demand for labor has declined. Thus, as people were forced to have
only one child for years, they have incorporated such expectation and embodied
this behavior into their new preferences and values. Consequently, rather than
choosing to have more children, parents are now more inclined to have fewer
children, but a higher standard of living for themselves as well as for their
children.
While theoretically the removal of the one-child restriction should
increase the demand for children by reducing the marginal cost of a second child,
data has shown that the demand for children has naturally decreased to a low
level among Chinese families. Therefore, it is unlikely that the fertility level will
rise as a result of the new policy as the changing valuation of children among
people has led to a decrease in the desired family size. In fact, when the policy
was relaxed in 2014 to allow some couples who met a certain criteria to have
more than one child, only 16.8% out of approximately 1.85 million couples who
were eligible applied for birth certificates for a second birth, reflecting the low
desirability of children in China today.66
A big limitation to my analysis is that the data on fertility is not accurate
since it fails to include unauthorized births in China. During the years when the
One-child Policy was in place, there were a growing number of unauthorized or
“out-of-plan” children. This was especially common in rural areas where family
size was bigger and where regulations were weaker than those in urban areas.
Parents would hide them from local officials to avoid fines and/or other
66
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penalties that they might not be able to afford. Studies have shown that
unannounced spot checks by the National Statistics Bureau had revealed
undercounts of up to 40 percent in some rural villages.67 Due to this large
number of unregistered children, the census figures produced through the
government’s household registration system might not be the most accurate and
thus might not reflect the real demand for children among Chinese families. As a
result, the decrease in demand for children could have been smaller than
expected, in which case the Two-child policy might have a bigger effect in raising
the fertility rate.
This thesis aims to provide information for policymakers, legislators, and
those who are interested in studying the legal and socioeconomic effects of the
Chinese family planning policies. After analyzing many important factors
influencing fertility decisions in China, I found that the Two-child Policy by itself
might not be enough to raise the fertility rate. The high childrearing cost and the
cap on the number of children that each family is allowed to have will limit the
effects of the new policy and keep the fertility rate at a low level. In order to
effectively increase fertility and the desirability of children, policymakers and
legislators might need to consider a more pro-active approach towards the
problem. Having had a low fertility rate for decades, Japan provides some great
examples that China can borrow from in terms of policy efforts to raise fertility
level. Putting an emphasis on lowering the childrearing cost, Japan initiated
childcare programs and provided child allowance to financially support working
families with children in order to promote more flexible work environments and
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a more gender-equal society.68 In this way, the government is essentially sharing
with the parents some of the responsibilities of childrearing to achieve both
higher productivity and higher fertility. Although not all these policies were very
successful, they do provide some ideas on different ways of approaching the
problem of low-fertility and an aging population.
Of course, this is not to say that China should or will be able to implement
the same policies as Japan did, considering that these are two countries with
very different demographic and economic conditions. However, by learning from
countries that are experiencing similar issues, policymakers in China might be
able to create a more practical and effective policy package to incentivize people
to have more children.
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